We present an empirical model of systemic banking crises from an Australian perspective. Having no history of domestic banking crises in recent history, our quantitative model is estimated using an international panel data set spanning 18 countries and 30 years of observations. We evaluate in a hazard-modeling framework the statistical and economic significance of variables that have been suggested by prior theoretical and empirical studies to be antecedents of banking crises, such as: measures of real estate price exuberance, asset returns and the growth of leverage. In quantifying the exposure of the banking system to real estate pricing, we identify dynamics consistent with 'boom-bust cycles' or bubble-like behaviour in the housing market. More generally, our findings yield measures of crisis risk exposure, but perhaps more importantly, guidance with respect to the variables that most influence crisis risk exposure.
Introduction
great propensity to reflect the expectations of investors whose estimates of property values are primarily based on their extrapolations of past price increases, and thus deviate above their fundamental values. On the other hand, banks and other financial intermediaries, as investors' credit suppliers, tend to make implicit assumptions by basing their assessments on market transaction prices and thus concentrate their lending in the housing sector (Case et al., 2005) . In the meantime, Jordà et al. (2015) observe that over the past century, the main business of banks has changed from deposit-taking institutions to highly-leveraged lending intermediaries with a lack of awareness of the potential risks. Given a combination of over-optimistic investors and credit suppliers with a diminished awareness of low frequency shocks, property prices can exhibit sustained deviations above their fundamental values. Consequently, the financial vulnerability to real estate sourced shocks can be heightened as the system is increasingly exposed to the housing sector.
While there are excellent studies investigating the causes and consequences of particular systemic banking crises, relatively few have attempted to quantify the risk exposure of financial intermediaries through econometric modelling even though the costs of banking crises preceded by credit expansions, as observed by Jordà et al. (2013) , tend to be more severe. Accordingly, we model financial intermediaries' exposure to crisis risk, with a particular focus on the role of real estate pricing. We estimate hazard models of banking crises, to quantify the determinants and dynamics of crisis exposure using asset price and bank-sector data from 18 countries. Our analysis suggests that growth in property prices relative to household income yields important information about crisis risk.
Long-term growth in the ratio of property prices to income is associated with escalating crisis risk, while short term growth in the same series is negatively associated with crisis risk. The contrasting pattern of association between crisis exposure and long versus short-term growth in the ratio of house prices to income is consistent with boom-bust patterns of adjustment in the property market. While long-term growth in the ratio of house prices to income suggests a steadily increasing exposure to the risk of a crisis, and the risk escalates dramatically in the wake of rapid (short-term) declines in the ratio of prices to income. Moreover, the sensitivity to short-term declines in the price to income ratio is consistent with sensitivity to property market busts. In other words, the sign and relative magnitudes of the coefficients provide indirect evidence of bubble-like patterns of adjustment in the property market. The signs and relative magnitudes of the coefficients also suggest the need for caution interpretation of the outputs of the model. While short-term increases in the price in income ratio suggest a diminishing exposure to crisis risk, it is important to realize that the risk response to short-term declines in the ratio is asymmetric and rapid.
Through modelling international experience, the proposed hazard model provides regulators with an analytical tool to assess the vulnerability of the banking system to real estate cycles and thus help establish the need for pre-emptive actions, such as tightening banks' lending standards and capital requirements, at times of escalating exposure to crisis risk. With the seemingly strong performance of banks' lending books, supervisory authorities may face an uphill battle in setting tighter limits on their lending activities especially when banks and borrowers are exuberant in their assessments of borrowers' income and the serviceability of mortgage loans. At such time, it may well seem that only regulators are concerned about the possibility of a bubble in real estate prices (Pascoe, 2015) . Thus, in contributing to the growing literature on quantifying the risk of banking crises, our proposed model provides an easily applicable quantitative input to regulatory risk assessments of systemic vulnerability to real estate sourced risks.
Paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic background of real estate cycles and systemic banking crises. Section 3 discusses prior empirical modelling issues related to potential predictors of banking crises, followed by Section 4, which focuses on the research design of the hazard model in terms of data specification and modelling method. Section 5 provides detailed modelling results and discussions. Section 6 concludes the major findings of the study.
Economic Background: Financial Intermediation and Real Estate Cycles
The economic importance of banks, and the financial sector more generally, has expanded in both developed economies and emerging markets as reflected in increases in credit to GDP ratios. Schularick and Taylor (2012) show that ratios of credit to GDP have doubled over the course of the past century, and they argue that the role of the credit system has altered in the post WWII era from that of an amplifier of shocks to that of an independent source of shocks. In line with the expansion of the financial sector, real estate became one of the main destinations of credit flows through increasingly leveraged financial intermediaries.
Credit has not only expanded in aggregate, its economic purpose has altered over time. Jordà et al. (2014) use a 140-year sample of disaggregated bank balance sheet data to show that the expansion of credit is attributable primarily to the rapid growth in mortgage-secured real estate lending in advanced economies. Whereas in 1900 mortgage loans accounted for approximately 30% of bank loan portfolios, they account for approximately 60% of bank loans in 2014. Jordà et al. (2014) thus argue that banks' core business has transformed from intermediating finance for production in the business sector to that of funding household real estate mortgages. Accompanying the shifts in the role of financial intermediaries, home ownership rates and household leverage ratios have tended to increase sharply.
Credit's expansion and concentration in the real estate sector not increases the exposure of the banking system real estate sourced shocks, it is also reflected, as shown by Crowe et al. (2013) , in the growing importance of real estate markets as a store of economic wealth. Moreover, Bordo (2008) argues that as real estate valuations account for a larger proportion of economic wealth, house price changes assume a much larger role in driving credit and business cycles. These effects are of a particular concern if, as shown by Herring and Wachter (1999) , credit availability is a driver of housing booms, or distortions in the pricing of real estate that, somewhat paradoxically, serve to increase the apparent attractiveness of real estate loans to banks. Herring and Wachter (1999) argue that banks are subject to a form of "disaster myopia" whereby the underestimate the impact of low frequency real estate sourced shocks on heavily concentrated portfolios. As argued in Case et al. (2005) , over-concentration in real estate lending may also be attributable to remuneration contracts based on shorter-term prof-itability and a reliance on government protection in the event of a crisis particularly when banks are large and considered systemically important.
The increased exposure of banks to real estate implies a greater exposure to the cycles inherent in real estate pricing. Schularick and Taylor (2012) highlight construction lags, the impossibility of short selling, the infrequency of trades and illiquidity as distinctive features of real estate markets that predispose them to pricing booms. With a low vacancy rate, a positive demand shock cannot be satisfied by new supply in the short term due to construction lags. A fixed short-term supply may itself foster a speculative demand, and a boom in property prices -an effect that may be sustained during the construction period. Even if prices rise above fundamental values, the illiquidity of the market and the impossibility of short sales preclude trades that counter the influence of investors whose high expectations of future price are based on extrapolations of recent price growth. Real estate prices can thus exhibit sustained departures from fundamental values, and Case et al. (2005) argue that when market-clearing prices can only be justified through beliefs in indefinite, continuous future price growth, then the boom is real estate prices should be considered a market bubble.
Speculative bubbles in real estate prices may be difficult to discern from real estate booms in real time, and bubbles may only be identified in the aftermath of a bust, or price collapse, and the associated debt overhang and deleveraging described by Jordà et al. (2014) . When property prices fall below the nominal value of loans in the banks' lending book, both speculative investors and owner-occupiers are more likely to default -either because they are unwilling to repay their over-priced loans, or are unable to refinance or sell their properties in the declining market and banks incur losses as the proportion of non-performing loans rises. At the same time, mortgagebacked securities buyers, who are the creditors of banks, will tend to leave the market when the bust occurs and uncertainties with respect the quality of the underlying loans increase. If, as argues by Bordo (2008) , both security issuers and leveraged security holders, are forced to leave the market, then property prices may further decline as the supply of credit tightens and thus trigger a downward spiral.
Given the difficulty of distinguishing in real time, the presence of real estate bubbles that may precipitate economically damaging recessions, our analysis incorporates the antecedents of crises with reference to observables variables, such as the pricing of real estate relative to income levels, without attempting to directly identify the existence of price bubbles.
Prior Empirical Modelling
Commensurate with their severe and adverse repercussions both domestically and globally, there exists a large literature on the causes and consequences of systemic banking crises. Moreover, given their significant economic, social and political impacts, there is an incentive to develop early warning systems that can facilitate timely regulatory intervention. In this section we first describe those variables that have been identified in the literature as leading indicators of vulnerability in the banking system. We then compare existing empirical methods designed to predict banking crises. Table 1 summarises the banking crisis literature pertinent to our work by listing the leading indicators of banking crises and specifying the source papers and their author(s). These papers can be broadly categorised as being either descriptive case-by-case studies on country's historical experiences or empirical analysis based on a panel dataset. 1 Descriptive literature identifies historical regularities before a banking crisis occurs and evaluates the effectiveness and efficiency of management policies applied after the collapse of the banking system. Panel studies mainly focus on identifying stylised factors that can indicate the event of banking crises as well as influence the severity and the recovery pace of crises. Empirical analysis contributes more to the identification of indicators of financial fragility, and the quality of panel data used can directly affect the consistency of the model outcomes.
Predictive Variables of Banking Crises
Identifying possible causes of banking crises in terms of leading indicators is the primary objective of most empirical studies on banking crises. Although the level of credit stock has been confirmed to be a powerful predictor of banking crisis, other variables are also widely considered in a range of empirical analysis, which include asset prices, external imbalances, economic growth and output, exchange rate and price stability, monetary aggregates, shortterm and long-term interest rates, fiscal deficits and banking sector factors (Kauko, 2014) .
The Credit Stock
The most extensively used crisis predictors in the existing literature are measures of excessive credit stock. Credit aggregation potentially heightens instability in the financial system. The growth rate of the credit stock and the ratio of credit-to-GDP are the two forms of lending variables that are commonly used by researchers.
Growth rates of different types of credit are investigated in prior studies. Domaç and Peria (2003) and Schularick and Taylor (2012) show that there is a positive relationship between the lagged credit growth and the risk of a banking crisis. Additionally, some studies focus on the credit stock of the private sector. The private credit-to-GDP ratio is shown to perform well in the prediction of banking crises (Borio and Drehmann, 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005) , while the business or corporate credit expansion offers a weaker result (Büyükkarabacak and Valev, 2010) . More recently, mortgage lending has been included in empirical testing after collection of large amounts of data and has been shown to have a stronger explanatory power than that of non-mortgage lending (Jordà et al., 2014; Lainà et al., 2015) .
Compared to the percentage change of credit, the credit deflated by GDP can be used to investigate whether the level of disconnection of credit from economic output is related to a crisis event. Additionally, it can provide some intuition about the level of financialisation in a particular country. Inconsistent conclusions have been drawn in research papers when the credit-to-GDP ratio has been used as one of the predictive variables. Some studies have confirmed that the credit-to-GDP ratio is a powerful predictor of banking crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Borio and Lowe, 2002) . However, for those studies focusing on crisis events in emerging markets it has been found to be insignificant (Joyce, 2011; Hahm et al., 2013) .
Asset Prices
Asset prices are also the potential drivers for financial instability. Allen and Gale (2000) argue that historically a banking crisis is often preceded by some sort of asset bubble, e.g. the South Sea bubble in England, the Mississippi bubble in France. Although real estate prices are a more ideal proxy for asset prices, stock market indicies are sometimes selected due to data limitations of property prices. Schularick and Taylor (2012) find the interaction between equity prices and credit-to-GDP ratio can highly affect banks' exposure to a crisis event. Borio and Lowe (2002) show that equity price performs better for advanced economies, while it has little explanatory power for developing countries.
Although equity prices are a potential predictor of banking crises, the growth rate of real house prices is shown to be a better crisis predictor in recent studies (Borio and Drehmann, 2009; Jordà et al., 2015) . It is even a more powerful predictor than credit growth (Barrell et al., 2010) . However, while changes in real property prices have been considered in the existing literature, no researchers have investigated the potentially critical adverse impact on financial fragility caused by property values becoming excessively disconnected from fundamental values as reflected in multiples like the price-to-income ratio.
External Imbalances
External imbalances are also proposed to affect the soundness and stability of the financial system. Various indicators are used as proxies of external imbalances, which include current account deficit, trade balance and net foreign debt. In the previous discussion of real estate markets, financial intermediaries are likely to borrow from overseas to assist their lending to the markets. External imbalances can have a potential role in heightening the vulnerability of a country's financial system. Some studies find the absolute current account deficit to be a significant predictor (Kauko, 2012; Sarlin and Peltonen, 2013; Karim et al., 2013) , while others argue that it can offer some explanations of crisis events only in the presence of some other variables (Jordà et al., 2011; Roy and Kemme, 2012) .
While little evidence is shown in the predictive power of trade balance with a proxy of changes in the terms of trade (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005; Büyükkarabacak and Valev, 2010) , net foreign debt reflects a country's cross-border exposure and has a promising role in signalling banking crisis, since obtaining funding from overseas can put the borrower in a more dangerous position than accessing credit domestically. Angkinand and Willett (2011) and Hahm et al. (2013) confirm the predictive power of net foreign balance to banking crises in both developed and developing countries.
Macroeconomic Variables
Macroeconomic variables, such as the level and growth of GDP, inflation rate and interest rates, are often included in the analysis of the causes of banking crises. While the GDP growth rate implies changes in economic output, real GDP per capita is often used as a proxy for the income level of a country. Both indicators are not found to be robust. A negative relationship between GDP growth rate in pre-crisis years and the crisis risk is found in some studies (Angkinand and Willett, 2011; Davis and Karim, 2008a) , but Domaç and Peria (2003) and Schularick and Taylor (2012) fail to find a connection.
Contradictory conclusions have been drawn for the inflation rate variable. While Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2010) and Kauko (2012) find that it has little effect on explaining the occurrence of banking crises, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Joyce (2011) find a positive relationship between the level of inflation and crisis risk.
Interest rate variables, as another macroeconomic variable, have also been closely investigated in prior studies. Short-term interest rates can directly affect banks' cost of funds, and some studies have shown that a low short-term interest rate can promote the credit boom and thus increase the exposure of risk to a banking crisis (Bordo and Meissner, 2012; Jordà et al., 2015) . Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2010) find contradictory results and argue that real interest rate is positively related to the probability of a banking crisis.
Financial Sector Variables
Other variables of the financial sector, which include foreign exchange rate, monetary aggregates and fiscal deficits, also have the potential to influence the stability of the financial system. Exchange rates are more relevant in the cases of "twin crises", which include both currency and banking crisis with the former worsening the latter (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) . Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and Beck et al. (2006) find no connection between currency depreciation and banking crisis, which is contradictory to Domaç and Peria (2003) and Angkinand and Willett's (2011) findings.
Regarding monetary aggregates, there are several types of proxies that are commonly used, which include the broad money to foreign exchange reserves, the ratio of money-to-GDP and the growth rate of broad money. Most significant evidence is found by investigating the relationship between money-to-reserves ratio and the probability of a banking crisis (Domaç and Peria, 2003; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005; Büyükkarabacak and Valev, 2010) . Schularick and Taylor (2012) argue that broad money can be a good proxy for credit before WWII, but not after.
Lastly, fiscal deficits have not been widely investigated in the existing literature, and the evidence is not robust even within the limited related studies. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find there is no connection between fiscal surplus and crisis events, while Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that larger fiscal deficits can heighten the probability of a banking crisis.
Banking Sector Factors
Some studies also focus on the impact of the banking sector in terms of banks' balance sheet information, but the evidence is inconsistent. Barrell et al.'s (2010) studies on advanced economies claim that the indicator of deposit insurance or the level of financial liberalisation offer little insight into the system's fragility. They find little evidence of the predictive powers of bank concentration and supervision variables to crisis events. Instead, they focus on banks' balance sheet variables and show that both banks' capital adequacy and level of liquidity are negatively related to the probability of a crisis. Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2010) , on the other hand, fail to find the connection between banks' liquidity ratio and crisis events, but they show that a higher growth rate of banks' debt can heighten the vulnerability of the banking system. Over the last century, the primary business of banking has switched from business financing to mortgage intermediation (Jordà et al., 2015) . These changes in the composition of banks' balance sheets increase banks' exposure to the property markets and thus have the potential to increase the financial fragility in the case of asset bubbles.
Prior studies on potential predictors of systemic banking crises vary from both selections of predictive variables and choices of analytical tools. As discussed above, inconsistent conclusions have been drawn on the significance of explanatory variables among different variable classes. In this study, selections of variables are studied in the international setting with a focus on the real estate market, which will be further discussed in Section 4. Both property prices and the credit stock variables are included in the baseline specification to examine the "two disconnections" in the lead up to crisis events, including the disconnection of property values to income levels and that of the credit aggregation to economic output. Other potential predictive variables include share prices, net foreign liabilities, interest rate variables and banking sector variables.
Comparison of Modelling Methods
Previous studies use a variety of analytical techniques to develop early warning systems of systemic banking crises. While signal extraction and binary regressions are the two dominant methods, we prefer to use a hazard model which offers several important advantages as outlined below. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) first introduced the signals method, and it has also been used by Borio and Lowe (2002) and Borio and Drehmann (2009) . In this method, a crisis event is deemed likely to occur if the predictive variable fluctuates beyond a threshold value. The threshold value is determined to minimise the noise-to-signal ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the proportion of false alarms in all possible false signals to the proportion of correct alarms in all possible correct signals. While strong non-linearities are allowed between the explanatory variable and the crisis occurrence under the signals method (Alessi and Detken, 2011) , it is an univariate model such that the joint significance of multiple variables cannot be tested.
Binary regressions, using either probit or logit specifications, are widely used in previous research. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), Beck et al. (2006) and Davis and Karim (2008a) used the logit model to assess the predictive power of potential predictors, while Wong et al. (2010) applied the probit regression model. Lainà et al. (2015) used both signal extraction and logistic regression methods in their study and found that although the signals method is univariate, its results are supported by the multivariate logistic model. Other methods used include the binary recursive tree approach, e.g. Cashin and Duttagupta (2008) , Karim (2008) and Davis and Karim (2008b) while Sarlin and Peltonen (2013) use the self-organising maps method.
We choose the hazard or multiperiod logit model for our analysis. This approach was developed by Shumway (2001) and applied to the related problem of predicting corporate bankruptcy. Hazard models of this sort are advantageous as they address the problem of censoring inherent in modelling time to event data by automatically controlling for the period at risk. They also allow multiple time-varying covariates. Being multivariate in nature, the model enables assessment of the predictive power of variables from different classes in forecasting systemic banking crisis. Global analysis in Davis and Karim (2008a) suggests that logit analysis outperforms alternative methods in an international setting. Time-varying covariates capture changes in economics conditions that occur prior to the onset of a banking crisis. This enhances the quality and reliability of early warning signals generated by the model.
Data and Method
Based on our discussion in the previous section, we estimate a hazard model that utilizes a representative subset of variables identified as leading indicators of an impending crisis in the banking system. In particular, we focus on the role of excessive over-pricing of property. Since Australia has not experienced any recent banking crises, we utilise data on historical systemic banking crises that have occurred elsewhere.
Sample data
Our sample reflects the experience over the last four decades of 18 advanced economies belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The countries selected are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Most of the sample countries suffered at least one banking crisis during the sample period. Since systemic banking crises are relatively rare events, we include both the latest wave of banking crises, the global financial crisis (GFC), as well as those around the 1980s in order to obtain a sufficiently long time series. In total, the data set contains 18 systemic banking crises during the period from 1975 to 2014.
Systemic Banking Crisis Data
We focus on banking crises which have caused country-level distress, namely systemic banking crises. Following Laeven and Valencia (2013) , we define a systemic banking crisis to be a event resulting in a large number of defaults and causing a wide range of financial distress in the banking system, as well as involving policy intervention from the country's government. Table  2 lists the 18 countries in the data sample and the included crisis periods based on quarterly intervals. Crisis durations are sourced from the World Bank (WB) database and commencement dates are consistent with those recorded in Laeven and Valencia's (2008; systemic banking crisis database. Both databases identify the banking crises in the years of occurrence. To better picture the lead up to those crises, it is useful to code the exact quarter of the year in which a banking crisis occurred since most of the explanatory variables obtained in the data sample have a quarterly frequency. Table 2 lists the starting quarters which are determined by searching through relevant newspaper articles and academic evidence. Three countries do not experience a systemic banking crisis in the data sample, namely, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. For robustness, we use alternative crisis definitions and obtain consistent results. 2 Table 3 presents the original data obtained from various sources by classes, which will later be used in the transformation of potential explanatory variables for hazard models. Variable classes are consistent with those emphasised in Kauko's (2014) review paper and we add some additional variables in our paper. Variable classes include credit stock, asset prices, the current account, monetary aggregations, interest rates, fiscal deficits, macroeconomic conditions and banking sector specific factors. As can be seen from Table 3 , most of the variables have quarterly frequencies, while others are on an annual basis. 
The Hazard Model
We use hazard models to estimate the conditional probability of a systemic banking crisis through multivariate logistic regressions. According to Shumway's (2001) study, hazard mod-els offer a well-developed framework, and such models have been very successfully employed in related applications, including models of firm-level financial distress. In contrast to static models, such as a logit model, hazard models have several advantages. Hazard models address the censoring problems inherent in modelling time to event data by controlling for time at risk. The problem of time at risk is not adjusted by static models, but hazard models adjust for period at risk automatically. Additionally, hazard models incorporate time-varying covariates which is not possible when using static models. With the application of hazard models, the conditions in the lead up to crisis events can be measured in terms of changes in the explanatory variables such that early warning signals for a banking crisis can be effectively captured by the applied models. Panel logistic regressions are used in the estimation of the hazard model.
To construct a hazard model, a dependent dummy variable, Y i,t , is used to indicate whether or not a crisis event occurs for country i at time t. The indicator Y i,t is coded 1 if a systemic banking crisis commences in country i within the four quarters (year) subsequent to the time t forecast date, and zero otherwise. Observations during a crisis, subsequent to its commencement, are treated as censored.
This study aims to model the conditional probability P (Y i,t = 1|X i,t ), where X i,t denotes a vector of selected explanatory variables. By coding the crisis dummy variable as above, the conditional probability is defined as the probability of a banking crisis in the next year. Let P i,t denotes the probability of a banking crisis at time t for country i, so that,
According to the logit model, the logistic function of P i,t is as follows,
where β denotes the coefficients for X i,t , including an intercept component. To estimate the conditional probability of a crisis, the logistic function is transformed into an equation of the log of odds ratio, where the odds ratio is defined as the ratio of the conditional probability of a crisis to that of a safe state without crisis events. Let I i,t denote the log of odds ratio, such that,
Now the original logit model can be transformed into a linear regression equation and the model estimates can be obtained using the following regression function,
whereβ is a vector containing the estimated coefficients, which are calculated using a maximumlikelihood method. In the estimation of the variance of the maximum likelihood estimators, Huber sandwich estimators of variance or robust standard errors are used to ensure the model's robustness against heteroskedasticity (Hoechle, 2007) .Î i,t denotes the estimated log of odds ratio at time t for country i, and the estimated conditional probability,P i,t , can then be computed using the following equation,P
As shown in Table 3 , the dataset contains both annual and quarterly variables as some variables are only available annually. The quarterly frequency enables the transformation of per quarter growth rates for some variables. Model estimates are obtained by running regressions on an annual basis using quarter three observations for each year. The hazard model is a forward looking model, which predicts the probability of a banking crisis in the next year. The crisis indicator switches to 1 as soon as a particular quarter is within a year of the crisis. All predictors are lagged either by a quarter or a year to ensure that they are observable for a given quarter. 
Selection of Variables
Previous literature identifies many potential predictors of banking system crises. We select a representative subset of these indicators that covers the different classes of variable. Table  4 lists the explanatory variables selected for the baseline model with the summary statistics. Panel A contains the descriptive statistics for Australia, and Panel B includes those for the full sample. Variable classes considered in the baseline model include asset prices (in terms of property and share prices), credit stock, external imbalances, and macroeconomic and banking sector variables.
To investigate both the short-term and long-term effects of property prices on the stability of the banking system, both the one-year and 15-year growth rates are included in the baseline model. Instead of computing the percentage changes of the property price index, the growth rates of the ratio of property price to personal disposable income are derived for the model. We use this ratio to provide information about the extent to which property prices have become disconnected from fundamental values.
Deviation of property values from a long-term growth trend may be cyclical. It may also imply that property values are rising at a higher than sustainable rate, which can in turn lead to a greater risk exposure of the overall financial system. It may be expected that a sustained increase in the ratio heightens the probability of a banking crisis. The short-term growth rate, on the other hand, is used to capture recent shifts in the price-to-income ratio. The relationship of short-term changes in the price-to-income ratio to a crisis event depend on whether the possibility of boom-bust cycles in property pricing is admitted and the relationship between such cycles and the banking crises. If such patterns of adjustment are admitted, then a bust (rapid near-term declines) in the property market may be expected to escalate crisis risk.
As shown in Table 4 , while the short-term average in the growth rate of the price-to-income ratios is similar in Australia to the other sample countries, the long-term average is substantially greater for Australia in the period from 1990 to 2015. For the 15-year growth rate of the Notes: This table reports the summary statistics of variables included in the baseline model. Panel A contains the summary statistics for Australia, while Panel B lists those for the full data sample and for each year, only quarter three data is used. Domestic credit (% GDP) denotes domestic credit as a percentage of GDP. P/I 1y growth rate and P/I 15y growth rate denote the 1-year and 15-year growth rates of the ratio of property price-to-income, respectively. Share price growth rate denotes the 1-year growth rate in share price index. International Debt growth rate denotes the 2-year growth rate of international debt issued by banks. Bank credit/deposit denotes the ratio of bank credit to bank deposit. Term spread denotes the difference between the long-term and short-term interest rates expressed as a percentage.
standardised property prices in Australia, the minimum is 8.30%, which implies that there is a sustained positive deviation of house prices from disposable income. While for some other countries, there are both rises and falls in the price-to-income ratio in the long-term: for the full sample this variable varies from -71.30% to 129.20%. Share price growth rate in the equity market is also included in the baseline model. For each quarter, the share price index uses the closing price of the last trading day of the quarter. For each year, the closing share prices on 31st March, 30th June, 30th September and 31st December are coded for quarter one, two, three and four, respectively. Additionally, the share price index for the overall equity market is used instead of that of the banking sector. Annual growth rates are then derived using this end-of-quarter price index. It is generally expected that a decrease in the short-term growth of the equity market can be associated with distress in the overall financial system. Australia's average growth rate is quite close to the sample average. As expected, the short-term stock price growth is more volatile than that of the property prices in terms of standard deviation.
The credit stock variable has been applied in many prior studies and shown to be of predictive importance for a systemic crisis. The domestic credit deflated by GDP is included to examine the effect of the disconnection between a country's credit aggregation and its domestic productivity. With the inclusion of asset price and credit growth variables, it can be examined whether a "twin-boom" is likely to exist in the lead-up to a banking crisis. A higher level and concentration of credit aggregation can hasten the negative feedback loop in which investors start deleveraging when asset prices start to fall. A sharp increase in the country-level leverage is expected to increase the vulnerability of the financial system and thus the country's risk exposure to a banking crisis. For Australia, the average credit aggregation level is lower than the sample average.
Other explanatory variables used in the baseline model include the 2-year growth rate of international debt securities issued by banks, the ratio of bank credit to bank deposit and the term spread. The growth rate of reliance on offshore funding (denoted as International debt growth rate) is a potential measure of external imbalances of a country's banking sector. With a higher level of exposure to foreign liabilities, the probability of a banking crisis may be higher. The ratio of bank credit to deposit offers some insight on the leverage of the banking system. As mentioned in the previous sections, as the main intermediaries of mortgage loans, an increasing leverage of the banking system can potentially affect the stability of the financial sector. Lastly, the term spread offers some insight into policy changes. Looser monetary conditions as implied by a decreasing term spread can be a potential trigger for booms in real estate markets (Jordà et al., 2015) and thus increase the risk exposure of the banking sector to a banking crisis sourced by real estate markets.
Results
We present our results with reference to a baseline model that incorporates candidate forecasting variables suggested by prior studies of systemic banking crises theoretical and empirical. In particular, the baseline model incorporates measures of asset price movements, the credit stock, external imbalances, economic growth, bank leverage and real estate price dynamics. We con-sider in turn the statistical and economic significance of the forecasting variables, the robustness of our findings to alternative model specifications, as well as a systematic cross-validation study of the model's out-of-sample forecasting performance. Notes: The definitions of the explanatory variables are consistent with those in Table 4 . Lag denotes one year lag of the annual variable and LagQ represents one quarter lag of the quarterly varible. LR Chi 2 denotes the chi squared statistics for the likelihood ratio test. AIC denotes the Akaike Information Criterion statistics. AUC represents the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve. The estimated coefficients are obtained using the regression function for the log of the odds ratio in Equation 4, Section 4. The figures within the brackets represent the standard deviations of the estimated coefficients. *** = Significant at the 1% level. ** = Significant at the 5% level. * = Significant at the 10% level. Table 5 presents the specification and estimates of the baseline model from the perspective a forecaster in the third quarter of a calendar year with access to mid-year financial information. All non-market forecasting variables are lagged by one quarter or one year dependent on reporting frequency. The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one if a crisis occurs during the subsequent 12 months, and zero otherwise. Once a crisis event is realized, the country is censored from the data set for a period of at least 12 months.
Model Estimates
In modelling real estate price dynamics we focus on the ratio of house prices to annual dsiposable income as a measure of relative valuation, which can also be interpreted as an index of housing affordability. To the extent that asset wealth, income and consumption are in a long-run dynamic equilibrium, variations in the ratio may, all else equal, reflect departures from fundamentals, which theory, and prior evidence of boom-bust cycles suggest may be sustained for an extended period, and rapidly corrected. As such, we model separately the long and short run dynamics of relative house prices.
The distinct roles of long and short-term growth in price to income ratios are borne out in the contrasting pattern of association between the probabilities of a systemic banking crisis suggested by the coefficient estimates in Table 5 . Long-term growth in the price to income ratio suggests a steadily increasing crisis exposure, while the risk escalates in the wake of declines in the short-term growth rate. The sensitivity to short-term declines in the ratio is consistent with sensitivity to property market busts, hence the signs, and as will shown shortly, the relative magnitudes of the coefficients provide indirect evidence of bubble-like patterns of adjustment in the property market. It is difficult to reconcile the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients relating to long and short-term price to income growth if one excludes the possibility of boombust cycles in real estate pricing, and as discusses in Section 2, there are strong ex-ante reasons to believe that such patterns of a adjustment are a feature of these markets.
Figures 1 and 2 plot 1 and 15-year growth rates in house prices to income for six representative countries: Australia, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway and the United States. Where applicable, systemic banking crises are denoted by vertical red lines on the time series plots. Evident in the plots are the dynamics suggested by the coefficients of the hazard model: crises tend to be preceded by a sharp decline in the house price to income ratio, as captured by the 1-year growth rate, after a period of sustained growth, as captured by the 15-year growth rate. However, other salient features of the data are also revealed. First, the short-term growth rate of house prices to income can exhibit marked volatility, and sharp declines in short-term growth rate, without reference to the long-term growth rate, are observable in isolation, without any attendant crisis. Second, given the inherent difficulty of forecasting turning points in such series, the short-term growth rate is probably most usefully regarded as a measure of exposure to crisis risk a point we return to in our discussion of marginal effects.
In combination with the long and short-run dynamics of house price to income growth, the hazard model estimates in Table 5 suggest that equity index declines over the preceding year and a diminution of the term spread on government issued bonds are statistically significant indicators of elevated crisis risk. Thus, the risk of systemic banking crises is increased by, or reflected in, the expectations of financial markets, and in the presence of these variables the remaining coefficients are statistically insignificant.
Marginal Effects
The economic significance of the logistic regression coefficients in Table 5 is not readily observable, so we present in Tables 6 and 7 the fitted probability outputs of the model by decile groups, Table 6 also provides a summary of within sample predictive accuracy to show that all crisis events are captured within the top five deciles, with 85% of crises falling within the three highest risk deciles. Table 7 summarizes the marginal effects of covariates with reference to Australian statistics at the end of June 2015, at which time the model implied probability of a systemic banking crisis is 2.7% -a risk exposure falling within the 7th highest decile presented in Table 6 . Table 7 documents the effects of the baseline model's covariates, expressed in (Australian) standard deviation units, on the probability of a systemic banking crisis. Focusing on the variables with statistically significant coefficients, the asymmetry of marginal effects is apparent in each case, and the two series with the greatest apparent impact are strikingly similar. Specifically, a standard deviation decline in either the short-term growth rate of the house price to income ratio or the term spread on government bonds, all else equal, yields a 3.3-3.4% increase in the probability of a crises thus propelling Australia's risk indicator to the second highest decile. A two standard deviation decline in either is enough to place Australia in the highest risk decile, all else equal. Corresponding increases in the same variables have comparatively modest, but almost identical effects, in the opposite direction. These effects are illustrated more generally in Figure 3 . Notes: Min Pr. and Max Pr. denote the minimum and maximum of estimated probabilities in each group as a percentage. The fifth column contains the number of estimated probabilities of historical crises included in each group. Crisis Frequency reports the number of crises as a percentage of the total observations in each decile group. The last column lists the cumulative proportion of crises captured by the model from the highest decile group to the lowest.
Similarly discernable from Table 7 and Figure 3 , crisis probability estimates are sensitive to below average growth in the share price index, albeit significantly less so than to either shortterm growth in house prices to income or the term spread. Increases in the 15-year growth rate of house prices to income increase crisis probabilities more moderately still but such increases serve to offset to some degree the impacts of any corresponding increase in the yearly price to income growth.
To summarize, based on mid-2015 Australian numbers, standard deviation or larger declines in annual house price to income growth, the term spread or annual equity price growth imply large increases in the risk of a systemic banking crisis in both absolute and relative terms. Corresponding increases have modest effects in lowering risk exposure. The relative importance Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of changes in explanatory variables on the estimated probabilities of a banking crisis for Australia. The first row represents the number of standard deviation changes. ∆ Pr. denotes the change in percentage in the estimated probability resulting from the changes in the variable(s). Decile denotes the decile group within which the new probability falls, according to the decile ranges in Table 6 . For example, a 1 standard deviation decrease in the 1-year property price-to-income growth rate can lead to a probability increase of 3.42% and thus shift the probability from the seventh decile group to the ninth. of house price to income growth and short and long horizons is consistent with a boom-bust pattern of adjustment in real estate values relative to income, and is of particular economic significance as a measure of exposure to fluctuations in the housing market.
Alternative Model Specifications
Since the baseline model estimates stress the relevance of both short-term and long-term growth rates in property price-to-income ratios, it is important to confirm that this result is robust to alternative model specifications. In this section we present results for the following modifications to the baseline model. We first exclude either the long-term or short-term growth rate in the property price-to-income ratio. Second, we replace both the short-term and long-term growth rates in price-to-income ratio with growth rates in the BIS house price index. Third, we add to the baseline models additional variables that reflect relevant macro-economic conditions that potentially influence the financial health of the banking system. In-sample tests of goodnessof-fit tend to favour the baseline model over these alternatives. Table 8 reports model estimates using different selection choices about how property price variation is measured. For ease of comparison, results for the baseline model are shown in the column for Model (1). Model (2) excludes the long-term effect of changes in the price-to-income ratio; Model (3) omits the short-term effect; Model (4) replaces the property price-to-income ratios with growth rates in the BIS house price index. When used alone, the short-term growth rate in price-to-income ratio loses its significance. Switching to price growth measures, the short-term growth rate remains significantly negative but the long-term growth rate in the property price becomes unimportant. To compare the goodness-of-fit of the respective models, we compute adjusted Akaike Information Criterion [AIC] statistics. 3 Model (1) has the lowest adjusted AIC, implying that our baseline model is superior in terms of model fit.
We also augment the baseline model by incorporating additional variables which are designed to capture relevant conditions in the banking sector and the broader economy that are plausibly associated with the likelihood of a banking crisis. Model (5) includes a country's government debt deflated by its GDP as a proxy for the level of fiscal deficits which have been shown to Table  5 . Adjusted AIC and adjusted AUC denote the adjusted statistics when regressions are applied to a subsample with common observations among the five models. The subsample contains 329 observations across 18 countries. *** = Significant at the 1% level. ** = Significant at the 5% level. * = Significant at the 10% level. Notes: This table reports the estimating results of models when additional explanatory variables are considered. The government debt (% GDP) denotes the government debt as a percentage of GDP. GDP growth rate denotes a 1-quarter growth rate of GDP. Liquid liabilities (% GDP) denotes the liquid liabilities as a percentage of GDP. Adjusted AIC and adjusted AUC denote the statistics when regressions are applied to a subsample with common observations among the five models. The subsample contains 166 observations across 17 countries. *** = Significant at the 1% level. ** = Significant at the 5% level. * = Significant at the 10% level.
be positively related to the probability of a banking crisis, e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) ; Barrell et al. (2010) . Model (6) adds the annual growth rate of GDP to assess whether changes in the country's productivity are relevant to the vulnerability of the economy as suggested by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998); Domaç and Peria (2003) . Model (7) includes liquid liabilities deflated by GDP as a proxy for the level of monetary aggregation. Finally, Model (8) adds the ratio of bank capital-to-total assets in order to capture any instabilities in the banking system caused by banks failing to meet capital adequacy requirements.
Results reported in Table 9 show that none of these additional macro-economic and banking system variables seem to be important. In each of Models (5)- (8), the coefficient on the new variable is not significantly different from zero. Importantly, the sign and significance of both short-term and long-term growth rates in property price-to-income as found in the baseline model are replicated in these other models. Moreover, the adjusted AIC statistics are all higher than for the baseline model, underlining its superiority.
In summary, the alternative model specifications considered in this section increase our confidence in the view that it is short-term and long-term growth rates in property prices relative to income that are the dominant indicators of an impending banking crisis. In addition to the specification checks discussed here, we have conducted additional robustness checks with respect to the specification of lag lengths, alternative crisis definitions, the presence of fixed versus random country effects, and the selection of the reference quarter for the analysis. While some of these modeling choices affect the degree of reported statistical significance, the basic/baseline results are remarkably robust to these variations. 4
Out-of-Sample Forecasting
In this section we test the out-of-sample forecasting ability of the baseline model against Models (2)-(4) by analysing the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC). Given the poor in-sample performance of Models (5)-(8), we exclude them from this analysis. Receiver operating characteristic curves measure the discriminatory power of a model in classifying crisis events. This curve plots the true positive rate against the false positive rate, for all cut-off levels. Let λ denotes the value of the threshold. A binary classifier gives a value of zero if the estimated probability,P , is less than or equal to λ, while it has a value of one otherwise. Good classifiers have higher true positive rates than false positive rates. If the true positive rate equals the false positive rate, the model is an uninformative classifier such that each crisis call signalled by the model is equally likely to be true or false. Figure 4 shows the in-sample ROC for the baseline model. To assess the predictive power of the model, the AUC is computed to test whether the model's signals are informative such that the distribution is statistically different under crisis and non crisis states. To be informative, the model's AUC must be larger than 0.5 while a value of one denotes a perfect classifier. Our baseline model is potentially a good classifier as its in-sample AUC statistic is 0.903 with a standard error of 0.0159. As disclosed in table 8, the adjusted AUC is highest for the baseline model compared to its competitors. 5 Figure 4 : In-Sample Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (Baseline)
Cross Validation
To further investigate the predictive power of the models, we apply the cross validation method of out-of-sample forecasting in this section. Cross validation analyses how well a model predicts a new outcome for new observations that are not used in fitting the model. For each subgrouping time, the data sample is randomly divided into ten disjoint subsets. Then for each subset, the remaining nine subsets are used for estimation, while the selected subset is reserved for testing. Predictions of that subgroup are computed using the new model estimates obtained from the combined subsample of the remaining nine subsets. Then the AUC statistic is calculated after out-of-sample predictions have been obtained from all subsets. This process is repeated 1,000 times to generate a distribution of AUC statistics for that model. For the four models listed in Table 8 , the same subgrouping is used each time in the tenfold cross validation. Table 10 provides summary statistics for the AUC of the models. Comparing mean values of AUCs to those listed in Table 8 , it can be observed that the former is lower than the later. Cross-validated AUCs are expected to be lower than in-sample AUCs since they are computed using subsamples that are not included in the model fitting. The ranking of the AUC average is consistent with the that shown in Table 8 . The baseline model has the strongest predictive power in terms of average AUC, although the standard deviations of the AUC statistics are quite similar among the four models. Figure 5 shows both histograms and kernel density plots of the resampled AUC statistics for the four models listed in Table 8 . These plots clearly show the outperformance of the baseline model.
Conclusions
The pernicious real effects of widespread financial distress in the banking system provide governments; regulators and the public more generally, with strong incentives to better understand the dynamics of an economys exposure to a systemic banking crisis. While the systemic banking crisis will manifest itself through some combination of bank runs, losses in the banking system, bank liquidations and/or significant government intervention in the banking system, its real effects may play out over a long period in the form of output losses and a deep recession with a slow recovery. For these and other reasons, governments and central banks have, rightly or wrongly, gone to extraordinary lengths to mitigate the impact of the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) -the long run effects of which are still open to question.
Given the potential for widespread economic losses, we present in this paper an empirical model of systemic banking crises from an Australian perspective. Having no history of domestic systemic banking crises, our quantitative model is estimated using an international panel data set spanning 18 countries and 30 years of observations. Using past descriptive studies and empirical models as a guide, we quantify the significance of variables that are commonly believed to be antecedents of crises with a particular focus on measures of house price exuberance and the intensity of bank financing. Measuring house price exuberance with reference to the growth of the ratio of house prices to household disposable incomes over long and short horizons, we identify dynamics consistent with boom-bust cycles or bubble-like behaviour in the housing market. Together with the trailing annual return on equities and the term spread on government issued bonds, these variables combine to form a hazard model that dominates competing specifications in terms of model selection criteria and out-of-sample forecasting performance.
Sample-based evidence with respect to the significance of bank leverage and credit growth is weak. Our results suggest that the reliance of banks on international funding sources, as measured by the issuance of international debt securities, is a significant measure of elevated exposure to crisis risk in several specifications of the hazard model, but those specifications are not selected with reference to model selection criteria or our forecasting study.
More generally, our model provides investors and regulators with a quantitative measure of the Australian banking systems exposure to a systemic crisis, relative to international historical experience in both absolute (probabilistic) and relative terms. Given a-priori reasons to be sceptical about probabilistic statements with respect to the likelihood of a systemic crisis, perhaps more importantly, our model provides guidance with respect to the variables that most influence crisis risk exposure. The key risk sensitivities are thus suggestive of further complementary analysis and potential regulatory attention. While the current analysis is conducted with a view to wide applicability using information that is readily available internationally, there is clear scope for extension of the model to incorporate other variables, including covariates that capture country specific features of banks and regulatory regimes.
B Tests for Equality in Distribution
To further examine the distributions of AUC statistics obtained using cross validation for the four models, two non-parametric tests for equality distribution are applied, that is the KruskallWallis (KW) and the Wilcoxon signed-rank sum tests. The KW test is used to assess the hypothesis that the location of Model (1) AUCs is equal to those of the AUCs of the other three models, while the matched Wilcoxon test further examines whether the location of Model (1) is to the right of the others, indicating higher out-of-sample AUCs. Table 12 reports KW test results for the location difference among Model (1) and the other three models. Let n denotes the overall sample size and n j denotes the sample size for the jth sample, where j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Let R j = nj i=1 R(X ji ) denote the sum of the ranks for the jth sample. The KW one-way analysis-of-variance test statistic, denoted H, is calculated using the following equation:
where the sampling distribution of H is approximately χ 2 with 3 degrees of freedom. From Table 12 , the p-value of the test is less than 0.001, and thus H 0 is rejected at 1% significance level. It can be concluded that at least two AUC distributions are significantly different from each other. Now the direction of the location differences can be further tested using the pairwise Wilcoxon test. It is worth noticing that the KW test is built on the assumption of independence distributions. As mentioned in the Section 5.4.1, for each time of the random grouping, the same subgroups are used for the computation of AUCs for the four models. Therefore, the matched-pairs Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Sum test is applied here instead of the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test, which assumes independent distributions.
Let d i denote the difference for any matched pair of observations, where d i = x 1i − x 2i , for i = 1, 2, ..., n. To further examine whether Model (1) produces a higher out-of-sample AUC, the following test hypothesis for the pairwise Wilcoxon Rank Sum test is applied.
By considering the signs of d j , the signed rank for observation i is denoted as r i , where r i = sign(d i )rank(|d i |). Let T denotes the test statistic, which is the sum of all r i s and T + denotes the sum of the positive signed-ranks, with E(T + ) = n(n+1) 4
and V ar(T + ) = 1 4 n i=1 r j 2 . Since the sample size is 1,000, a normal approximation is used to calculate the z statistics, where
Table 13 reports the test results when differences of AUC are considered between Model (1) and Model (2), Model (3) or Model (4), respectively. For all three tests, d i is found to be positive for all observations, which implies that Model (1) produces the highest AUC among the models for each random subsample. The null hypothesis is rejected for all three tests at a 1% significance level and thus it can be concluded that the AUC distribution for Model (1) is to the right of those of the other three models, which confirms the outperformance of the baseline specification in terms of out-of-sample predictive power. 
